Introduction
In this study, we analyze stock price reactions to environmental (EV) incidents for a sample of international firms in the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] . An EV incident is a company incident allegedly in violation of international norms on environmental issues. The EV incident data come from GES Investment Services (GES), and have only been used once before in academic research, in Lundgren and Olsson (2009) .
In efficient capital markets, stock prices on any day fully reflect all available information about the present value of a firm's future cash flows (Fama, 1991) . The empirical analysis in this paper is built on this notion. New information may cause abnormal changes in stock prices if the information deviates from expectations. We use event study methodology (see e.g. MacKinlay, 1997) to assess the effect on firm value of EV incidents. An appealing quality of event studies is that the direction of causation is quite clear. It is the release of information or the occurrence of an incident that causes stock value to change, and not vice versa. That is; good (bad) EV performance potentially induces good (bad) financial performance. This may seem obvious, but assumes significance given the fact that some studies establish a link between EV performance and financial performance, although the direction of causation is unclear (see Hay et al., 2005) .
In an overview of studies on EV performance and firm performance, Hay et al. (2005) 2 however concludes that empirical evidence concerning the relation between EV and financial performance is ambiguous (for other reviews, see e.g. Orlitzky and Benjamin, 2001; Orlitzky et al., 2003; and Orlitzky and Swanson, 2008) .
There are event studies that specifically consider EV news and effects on stock price (e.g. Diltz, 2002 , Klassen and McLaughlin, 1996 , Dasgupta et al., 2001 , Gupta and Goldar, 2005 , Lundgren and Olsson, 2009 ). These studies investigate good news (EV investments, awards, good green ratings) and/or bad news (pollution, bad green ratings, incidents) related to EV performance. Another frequent indicator of bad or good EV performance in this line of research is news about toxic releases (e.g. 2 In the ch. by P. Portney. Hamilton, 1995 , Khanna et al., 1998 , Konar and Cohen, 2001 , Khanna, 2001 ). As discussed in Khanna et al. (1999) , these types of studies are important for the design of voluntary approaches in EV policy to stimulate corporate social responsibility. If stock markets are likely to react significantly to the release of EV information about firms, then regulators can take this into consideration when designing EV policy, as a supplement to conventional command and control policy or other economic incentives such as taxes or subsidies. Furthermore, studies of corporate EV news connected to regulation -e.g. non-compliance, lawsuits -draw similar conclusions (Lanoie and Laplante, 1994 , Lanoie et al., 1998 , Dasgupta et al., 2006 ).
Several of the above studies find a positive relation between environmental events and stock price reactions. A positive relation means that good (bad) news is associated with increased (decreased) stock price. This agrees broadly with Margolis and Walsh (2001) who review 13 EV event studies, of which 6 studies document a positive relation, 3 a negative relation, 1 both a positive and a negative relation, and 3 no relation.
The main purpose of the study is to shed light on whether the revelation of EV incidents has any effect upon firm value. This is motivated by the mixed results of previous studies on the relation between EV incidents and stock price responses.
Moreover, we extend prior research by providing evidence on EV incidents from multiple countries on different continents. Furthermore, we examine a greater number of events than many of the prior studies; Diltz (2002) , Gupta and Goldar (2005) , Klassen and McLaughlin (1996) , each study less than 60 events, whereas we investigate 142 incidents (events). We also assess the robustness of our results to variations in methodology, because recent studies by Campbell et al. (2009) and Park (2004) indicate that multi-country event studies, such as the present one, could be sensitive to research design choices. Among other things, we use international versions of the market model as well as of multi-factor models of the Fama-French type; such multi-factor models appear not to have been used before in EV multicountry event studies. One non-parametric and three parametric test statistics of abnormal returns are employed.
The outcome of the study is of potential interest to many stakeholders. Corporations may take proactive measures to avoid EV incidents in case they are likely to be valuedestructive. Investors are interested in how stock prices respond to the release of news on EV incidents and whether it is possible to trade profitably on this information.
Lack of incentives (in the form of absence of stock market reactions to EV incidents)
for voluntary actions of companies may encourage swift and stringent response among regulators.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next, we present the conceptual framework, which discusses the mechanisms behind why bad news could lower firm value. Sections on methodological considerations, data, empirical framework and results follow. Lastly, conclusions and discussion are presented.
Conceptual framework
Several conceptual frameworks have been suggested to link environmental performance to firm value and most of them adopt some kind of expectations setting.
One of the more ambitious theoretical treatments is Laplante and Lanoie (1994) , which provide a relatively detailed model including expectations and behavioral assumptions for markets, regulators, and firms. The conceptual framework laid out here draws a lot on Khanna et al. (1998) . They cover both how the investors react to the revelation of environmental performance, and how the firm consequently reacts to the investor's behavior, in terms of e.g. choice of pollution level. Here we only tell the story from the investor's side, i.e., how the market may respond to environmental incidents.
The connection between environmental performance and profitability may be justified in several ways. For example, Lundgren (2003) , Kriström and Lundgren (2003) and Lundgren (2010) discuss in micro-economic, firm-level models of how "bad" social performance may have negative profitability effects due to loss of goodwill or reputational value. Other possible reasons are connected to management practices.
Investors may view pollution as a waste of inputs that are not used productively or as an indicator of bad management and lack of innovativeness. Furthermore, there is research indicating that local communities and NGOs may exercise considerable leverage to pressure firms to improve their environmental performance (see e.g. Afsah et al., 1996 , Blackman and Bannister, 1998 , and Pargal and Wheeler, 1996 . Thus, accounting only for fines and penalties and not considering the pressure that communities and markets may impose, the expected costs connected with substandard environmental performance may be underestimated (Dasgupta et al., 2006) .
On the other hand, the announcement of good environmental performance may have the opposite effect: more lax treatment by regulators, communities and the financial sector, and greater access to global markets and price premiums among the potential benefits (see e.g. Lundgren, 2010 , Lanoie et al., 1998 , or Konar and Cohen, 1996 , for additional discussion on potential effects).
In lack of mechanisms that continuously provide information about a firm's likelihood of incidents, and thus environmental performance, the investors do not have full information to accurately predict an incident and thus environmental performance. 
where is a prediction error. This implies that actual environmental performance could be larger, smaller or equal to the expected environmental performance. In the same way, the actual rank of a firm may be higher or lower than the expected rank,
Define the actual market value of a firm at time t, EP , and its relative rank
Investors are assumed to have full information about financial health, but incomplete information on environmental performance and rank. The ascribed or expected market value of a firm can then be written,
When the true environmental performance is revealed to the investors, e.g. here in
case of an incident, it is likely that actual market value,
A it V , diverge from the expected value,
. The change in the market value in each time period is then given by the difference between actual outcome and expected outcome,
This implies that if an environmental incident is "out of expectation", the market reacts and thus lower the value of the firm.
Methodological considerations
When it comes to method, most event studies are performed by first estimating a model to assess normal returns, and then using these estimates to investigate whether there are abnormal returns in an event window. are prohibitively expensive to compile or often simply do not exist. " (Faff, 2001, p. 2) Instead, we use a recently released family of indexes, the MSCI Global Investable Market Indices, which permit us to create proxies of the Fama-French SMB and HML factors for countries other than the US. We do not attempt to use industry factors.
This is based on Thompson (1988) who empirically compares industry, marketindustry and market models, and find that they produce very similar event study for correct inference in multiple-country samples", in particular in studies with multiday event windows, which are used here. The reason is that the statistical properties of multi-day multiple-country stock returns are such that common parametric eventstudy test statistics, which rely on the normal distribution, and work well on fairly normally distributed US data, tend to be miss-specified and of low statistical power.
In response, we examine several widely used test statistics, both parametric and nonparametric, including the generalized sign (GS) test which is the best performing statistic in the multi-country setting analyzed by Campbell et al. (2009) . Compared to the sample in Campbell et al. (2009) , the sample used in this study contains larger firms and includes US firms. We therefore expect stock return distributions to be closer to the normal distribution than in Campbell et al. (2009) Other research design considerations include the return form, the length of the estimation period, and the treatment confounding events. Rate of returns may be calculated as simple returns or continuously compounded returns (see, e.g., type of return leads to similar results in event studies. We use simple returns.
Increasing the length of the estimation period increases the number of observations to base the estimations on, but a longer estimation period probably also increases the likelihood of structural changes in model parameters. In addition, longer estimation periods increase data requirements in general and can result in fewer observations. Corrado and Zivney (1988) compare an estimation period of 239 days to one as short as 89 days and find that the test statistics are "virtually unaffected". We employ an estimation period of 88 trading days (around 4 months), since a longer estimation period would result in loss of valuable observations.
Another concern is confounding or extraneous events in the event period, that is, other potentially price changing events than the event under examination. One would however expect the net impact on stock price from diverse events to be zero in repeated measurements. Thompson (1988) investigates the impact of extraneous events and concludes that they have little impact on event study results. Based on the preceding, we do not make any adjustments for extraneous events. In addition to presenting results for the full sample, researchers sometimes present results for a reduced sample excluding the extraneous events they have been able to identify. Armitage (1995) points out that adjustment of this kind may be partial, because it is difficult to identify all the many extraneous events there are.
Data
The empirical analysis use EV incident data and stock and market index returns.
These data are described in turn below.
Incidents
The incident data were supplied by GES, which describes the data as follows:
" Table 2 shows the number of firms with a particular number of incidents. 42 firms have just 1 incident. 15 firms have 2 incidents. One firm has a many as 11 incidents. According to Table 3 , the majority of incidents in our sample happens to US firms.
According to relative frequency, the UK has most incidents per firm. (Fama and French, 1993) .
Specifically, the indices used in the study are the ACWI IMI Core (ACWI) and country IMI Core indices for the ten countries listed in 
where small cap growth index return at time small cap value index return at large cap growth index return at large cap value index return at . 
Foreign currency exchange rate
Park (2004) suggests including in the model of normal return a factor related to the movements in foreign currency exchange rate a stock is exposed to. As a proxy for this factor, we use daily returns of JP Morgan's broad nominal trade-weighted exchange rate indices. This kind of index is a weighted average of a basket of foreign currencies, where the weights reflect the foreign currencies share in the export and import of the domestic country. 6 For three countries (Finland, Germany and Netherlands) with Euro, the weights are based on the international trade of the whole Euro-zone, and are thus probably less representative for each one of these countries.
The exchange rate indices were downloaded from Thomson Datastream.
Empirical framework
The effects of the incidents on firm value are analyzed as follows. 
Further, we also make the following assumption, 
The parameter c it corrects event window variance to account for possible increase in variation outside the estimation period (see Patell, 1976 With only one factor, collapses to the variance correction term in equation (6a) in Patell (1976) . 
which is approximately unit normal. Define the normalized sum (over L) of cumulative standardized abnormal returns of event i as,
The main reason for using standardized abnormal returns is that it prevents securities with large variances from dominating the test. 9 The multiplication of the denominator by L scales the daily standard deviation to an L-day standard deviation corresponding to the event window length. Finally, form the normalized sum (over N)
to obtain the following test statistic,
8 This assumption may seem superfluous since the market model implicitly assumes that all crosssectional dependence is captured by the market. We include this assumption explicitly only because we relax it later.
9 Standardizing means each observation is weighted in inverse proportion to the standard deviation. Warner (1980, 1985) conclude that in principle standardized abnormal returns is superior to unstandardized, but in very short-horizon event studies, it makes little difference what measure is used.
P is a t-statistic, used in, e.g., Patell (1976) , which can be used to test whether incidents have any significant effect on returns during the specified event window.
A risk when forming is that possible event induced variance is ignored. 
The appropriate t-distributed test statistic is then, so that average cumulative abnormal returns over all events can be written,
A (simple) t-test statistic of abnormal returns is then specified as,
Note that this test will not be sensitive to changes in variance due to out-ofestimation-period forecasting or event induced variance.
Finally, the non-parametric GS test (Cowan, 1992; Campbell et al., 2009 ) is applied.
The null hypothesis of the GS test is that the fraction of CARs having a particular sign 10 In an extensive review of the event study literature, Khotari and Warner (2006) concludes that specification bias arising due to cross-correlation in returns can be a serious problem, especially for long-horizon tests of price performance.
is equal to the fraction of estimation-period abnormal returns with that sign. We test the null of a non-negative sign. The one-sided alternative hypothesis is that the number of stocks with negative CAR in the event window exceeds the number expected in the absence of abnormal performance. The number expected is based on p , the fraction of negative abnormal returns in the estimation period
1 if 0 where 0 otherwise
The GS-test statistic is
where w is the number of stocks for which the measure of abnormal return (CAR or BHAR, see below) in the event period is negative.
The four statistics T 0 , P, BMP and GS are used to test whether abnormal returns associated with environmental incidents are negative.
The tests are carried out for alternative windows, symmetric and asymmetric, surrounding the event day. The motivation for this is to account for uncertainty about the actual incident date. Using longer event windows increases to likelihood of including the event when its date is uncertain, but it also increases the risk that other events confound, thereby potentially decreasing the statistical power of the event study method (Brown and Warner, 1980; MacKinlay, 1997) . Moreover, the number of incidents possible to analyze decreases with longer event windows, because there is an increased tendency for desired estimation and event windows to extend outside the date range of available data. In selecting the event window-lengths to analyze, we attempt to balance these considerations.
We also conduct some sensitivity analyses based on factor model buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR), which over the period t b to t e is defined as 
BHAR t t r NormalReturn
= = ⎡ ⎤ = + − − + − ⎢ ⎥ ⎣ ⎦ ∏ ∏ .(24)
Results
We estimate the following 10 variations of the normal return model, equation (8) , We present results from the estimation period, because we think it is important to provide evidence on the goodness of fit of the different normal models with daily returns and whether simpler models perform differently than more elaborate ones. In addition, to our knowledge there appear to be no recent results on the issue. Jain (1986), for instance, presents somewhat detailed estimation period results for the market model, but later studies seem to omit results from the estimation periods. It seems interesting to include the specifications with the Fama-French factors as these factors originate from a later date. Moreover, implementing the world index single factor model (Model 1) requires considerably less data than Model 9, the most complex one. In the latter case, with 10 countries and 7 currencies, 57 indices 11 are needed compared to one world index series. Of course, compared to the total amount of data used in a study such as this one, the additional number of data series this generates may appear immaterial. But if certain data are expensive or difficult to obtain, e.g., the Fama-French factors, it seems desirable to be able to exclude such data based on empirical evidence. ** There are more observations for Model 1, because the world index is available for all countries, whereas the ACW local market indices and factors are only available for 10 countries.
In the following, we focus the discussion on regression model performance in terms of explanatory power and the proportion of significant coefficients.
Comparing Adj.R 2 (coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom) of Model 1 and 2 reveals that country indices on average explain 14% more of the variation in stock returns than do the world index. Explanatory power is increased substantially by using country indices instead of the world index. The country index (world index) betas are significant at the 5% level in 96% (88%) of the regressions.
Using both the world index and an ortogonalized country index, as in Model 3, only increases average Adj.R 2 by 1% compared to Model 2.
Including the return on a foreign currency exchange index lead to marginal increases in explanatory power, except for Model 4 where Adj.R 2 goes up by 5% compared to Model 1. In Model 4, the fraction of significant coefficients on the currency factor is 45%; otherwise, it is below 0.135.
In Model 10, which is Model 3 with country SMB and HML factors added, mean 
Event period
We test for abnormal returns of EV incidents for all firms regardless of geographical location, and separately for US, non-US and European firms. We use all 10 different normal return models. We explore event windows of different length, by varying the numbers of pre-event and post-event daysSpecifically, we use Pre=0, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50, Post=0, 5, 10, 20, 30, 40, 50 . The shortest resulting event window is 1 day (0+1+0), and the longest 101 days (50+1+50). In total, we examine 1960 (4*10*49) combinations of firm nationality, normal return models, and event windows.
Although average CARs are negative (barring a handful exceptions) across these 1960 combinations, it is only for European firms with EV incidents that we find abnormal returns that are statistically significant. We therefore report results only for the European sample. Moreover, to conserve space, we confine the presentation of results to Model 2, which is parsimonious and performs quite well in the estimation window, and to Model 9, the most elaborate model with the highest explanatory power in Table   4 . (Results for the other normal return models are similar.) In addition, examining
Model 2 is interesting, since Campbell et al. (2009) find Model 2 to be "sufficient" in multi-country event studies. Table 5 presents the event study results according to Model 2 and 9. Panels 2A and 9A display average CAR, acar, for different event windows surrounding the event date, the EV incident publication date. These panels suggest that there is a statistically and economically significant negative stock price reaction to EV incident reports.
According to both Model 2 and 9, acar is significantly negative at the 5% level or better for the (-40, 40) , (-30, 30) , (-30, 20) and (-20, 20) T 0 tends to reject the null too frequently. 12 As expected, (untabulated results indicate that) the return distributions of the 1260 stocks used in this study exhibit less skewness and kurtosis than those of the stocks in Campbell et al. (2009) . Also, for the European sample, we cannot reject that car of Model 2 and 9 in the (-30, 20) window is normally distributed.. 13 Although T 0 rejects the null the strongest and most often, the test statistics used here perform quite similar.
Conclusion and discussion
This paper investigates by event study methodology if environmental (EV) incidents affect firm value negatively. We use a global data set on incidents from GES Investment Services, which contain 142 EV incidents for some of the largest corporations in the world covering the years [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] .
The main result is that the EV incidents are generally associated with loss of firm value, but which are not statistically significant, except for firms in Europe. In addition to being statistically significant, the observed abnormal returns should also be of economic significance to corporations and investors. We subjected the results to a battery of robustness tests. We used international versions of the market model as well as multi-factor models of the Fama-French type, including foreign currency exchange factors. We employed different parametric and non-parametric test statistics. Overall, the results were rather insensitive to these variations in methodology. The findings of this study thus support the conclusion of Campbell et al. (2009) that normal return models with a single local market factor are sufficientcompared to models involving more factors -in multi-country event studies. Despite differences in method, models and data, the results and conclusions of the present study agree in general with those of Lundgren and Olsson (2009) .
There is also evidence pointing to US firm values being insensitive to EV incidents, implying that investors have different views on EV incidents in Europe and the US. A likely explanation for this difference relates to differences in the regulatory environment. Konar and Cohen (2001) propose that the occurrence of EV incidents might lead to more severe regulatory actions, which could have negative impact on firms' profitability. This effect is probable more pronounced in Europe than in the US, because the regulatory environment is less stringent and developed in Europe. In other studies on US firms it is often found that environmental news have an impact on firm value through stock price change, e.g. Hamilton (1995) Khanna et al. (1998 Khanna et al. ( , 1999 , and Konar and Cohen (2001) . Our results would contradict their findings.
However, the present study setting is somewhat different, since we are looking at a different period, and we only study bad news, i.e., EV incidents. Other studies have often focused on good news or a mix of bad and good news, e.g. the toxic release information studies by Hamilton (1995) and Khanna et al. (1998 Khanna et al. ( , 1999 .
The findings in this paper suggests that a firm's voluntary effort to avoid EV incidents may be more pronounced in Europe than in the US, since "punishment" from stakeholders is more likely (here in the form of loss in firm value). This means that policy directed towards designing e.g. public disclosure programs of EV performance, 14 which increase transparency with respect to EV issues, have the potential to be successful when it comes to motivating firms to voluntary internalize externalities from production. 15 Furthermore, Rauscher (2006) , in a study of voluntary emission reductions, suggest that if there is a social reward (punishment) for corporate social responsibility (irresponsibility), then traditional EV policy, e.g. taxes and subsidies, may hamper the private provision of voluntary over-compliance. That is, social rewards (punishments) may be crowded out by EV regulation in the shape of a tax or regulation.
